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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR SAFETY
IN THE MINES: A REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY HISTORY
WITH PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
DIANE C. CHERNOFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
The mining of coal and other minerals traditionally has been
regarded as a uniquely dangerous occupation. While modern
mining technology has advanced well beyond the use of rudi-
mentary equipment, the advent of sophisticated mechanization,
complex engineering techniques and generally improved work-
ing conditions has not eradicated the safety and health hazards
to which mine employees are exposed. Recent findings of the
President's Commission on Coal show that in 1979, there were
144 fatalities and over 18,000 disabling injuries in coal mining
alone.1 Mine disasters in the early 1970's at the Sunshine Silver,
Buffalo Creek and Scotia mines claimed at least 250 lives.2 More
than 10,000 injuries occurred in the metallic and non-metallic
mineral industries in 1977.1
The federal government has attempted to protect miners
from these safety and health hazards with a series of federal
laws. Each successive law has been directed at holding mine
operators accountable for maintaining safe mining conditions. It
is believed that mining operators will be more responsible if
held accountable for mining conditions. This, in turn, ultimately
should result in promoting the safety of the miners.
In 1966, Congress enacted the Federal Metal and Nonmetal-
*J.D., Georgetown University, 1981.
President's Commission on Coal. Summary Findings 12.
S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3401, 3404.
1 MSHA, DEPT OF LABOR, INFO. REP. No. 1R1106, INJURY EXPERIENCE IN THE
NONMETALIC MINERAL INDUSTRIES (EXCEPT STONE AND COAL) 1977 (1979); MSHA,
DEP'T OF LABOR, INFO. REP. No. 1R1104, INJURY EXPERIENCE IN THE METALLIC
MINERAL INDUSTRIES 1977 (1979).
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lic Safety Act of 1966.' Three years later, the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969 was enacted.' These acts were
administered by the Department of Interior through the Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA).'
This regulatory scheme was subject to increasing criticism
based on charges that the laws were not broad enough to cope
with mine safety and health problems. Consequently, in an
effort to consolidate all mining regulations under a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme (rather than separate laws for different
types of mining), Congress passed the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977,1 which superseded the 1969 and 1966 laws.
The Act transferred administration of safety and health regula-
tion for all types of mining to the Department of Labor and
established a new Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) to enforce the law.
The express purpose of the 1977 law is "to promote safety
and health in the mining industry, [and] to prevent recurring
disasters. . . ."' The Act states, "[T]he priority in the industry
must be the health and safety of miners and the prevention of
death, serious physical harm and occupational diseases."'
The Act sets forth various mandatory safety and health
standards,"° and authorizes the Secretary of Labor" to pro-
mulgate and revise improved mandatory standards to protect
against injuries and fatalities in coal or other mines." To assure
Federal Metal and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 89-577, 80
Stat. 772 (1967).
' Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-473, 83
Stat. 742 (1970).
' Various operations relating to the mining industry but excluding actual
"mines", were, and to some extent still are, regulated under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA). 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-78 (West 1975).
' Federal Mine Safety and Health'Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1980), codified at 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-78 (West Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter the 1977 Act].
3 H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [1977]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3485.
9 30 U.S.C.A. § 801(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1981).
10 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 841-2, 861-77 (West 1971 & West Supp. 1981).
" Hereinafter the Secretary.
12 30 U.S.C.A. § 811 (West Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 83
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compliance, federal inspections of mines are authorized. 3 Fur-
thermore, the 1977 Act prescribes enforcement mechanisms
which include the issuance of citations and orders of with-
drawal.' Civil and criminal penalties can be assessed for viola-
tions of the Act and its regulations."5
II. THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR PROBLEM
The 1977 Act seeks to promote a health and safety con-
sciousness, backed by sanctions, to secure a qualitatively better
work environment in all mines. To this end, Congress places
"primary responsibility"'6 for maintaining safer and healthier
conditions on mine "operators"." In this context,,a complicated,
and as yet unresolved, issue arises as to who is the legally
responsible "operator" in those situations where more than one
employer is engaged in work at a mine site.
One particular aspect of this problem, and the focus of this
discussion, is the situation where a mine operator contracts with
independent contractors who perform various services at the
mine site. 8 The assignment of liability becomes problematic
where the independent contractor, as opposed to the mining
company, violates the Act or regulations on mine property.
The scope and existence of this problem is the result of
widespread reliance in the mining industry on independent con-
tractors. Generally, independent contractors are retained to pro-
vide services which the company is unable or unwilling to per-
form itself. Most commonly contracted out is work requiring
highly specialized or technical services such as electrical work,
11 The 1977 Act requires at least four full inspections annually for
underground mines and at least two annual inspections for surface mines. Addi-
tional inspections are authorized under certain conditions. 30 U.S.C.A. § 813
(West Supp. 1981).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 814 (West Supp. 1981).
, Civil penalties are mandatory for all violations of a mandatory health or
safety standard. 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(a) (West Supp. 1980). Criminal penalties are to
be assessed only for willful violations. 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(d) (West Sup. 1981).
,1 1977 Act, supra note 7.
17 Id.
" To avoid confusion from use of the word "operator," which has legal
significance, the primary mine operator will be referred to as the "mining com-
pany".
1981]
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specialized machine maintenance, blasting and drilling. Addi-
tionally, contractors are hired to perform haulage and other
transport services as well as many types of construction work.
Consequently, at any given time, there can be numerous
employees of independent contractors on mine property engaged
in a multitude of services which may or may not be functionally
related to the primary mining operation.
This operator/independent contractor issue has important
ramifications in the public health and safety context. Since the
Act is premised on the .use of sanctions to ensure compliance
with mandatory health and safety standards, citation of the
appropriate party for violations is crucial to sensible, efficient
enforcement of the law. It necessarily follows that the business
entity responsible for the hazards it creates should be the party
against whom the sanctions are imposed. Only by sanctioning
the business entity in the best position to control the affected
empl6yees and work environment can maximum compliance
with the 1977 Act be obtained. Moreover, this entity is in the
best position to quickly abate any violation.
If the goal of compliance with the mandatory health and
safety standards is to be effectuated, a rational enforcement
policy should have the utmost priority. When determining who
should be cited for an independent contractor's violations, the
following policy aims should be considered:
(1) The source of the violation should be isolated so that it
will be properly and quickly abated.
(2) Enforcement should be aimed at all operators (companies
and contractors) so that the need for prevention of violations
becomes instilled in the consciousness of all operators.
(3) Incentives to establish safe and healthy work practices
should be provided.
(4) Optimum cooperation between mine companies and con-
tractors should be fostered so as to assure that training require-
ments are met and violations are prevented.
(5) Employees of mining companies and contractors should
be protected from needless exposure to hazards.
(6) The undue penalization of any party should be prevented.
[Vol. 83
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(7) The employment of independent contractors to perform
work which mining companies are unable to perform should be
promoted. 9
In light of these considerations, the question arises as to
whether the traditional enforcement policies followed by MSHA
comport with the remedial intent of the statute. In the past,
only the mining company has been cited for violations of the Act
or regulations regardless of the circumstances. Since this policy
is now in a state of flux, the viability of such a policy should be
analyzed.
III. STATUTORY PROVISONS OF THE 1977 ACT
A. Definitions
The Act defines "operator" as "any owner, lessee or other
person who operates, controls or supervises a coal or other mine
or any independent contractor performing services or construc-
tion at such mine."20 A "miner" is "any individual working in a
coal or other mine."'" A "coal or other mine" is broadly defined
to include not only the area from which minerals are extracted,
but also areas appurtenant to mine property and "lands,
excavation, underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels
and workings, structures, facilities, equipment, machines, tools
or other property ... used in, or to be used in, or resulting from,
the work of extracting such minerals from their natural deposits
... or used in, or to be used in, the milling of such minerals, or
the work of preparing coal or other minerals... ."2' These defini-
tions indicate that the Act contemplates the broadest possible
scope of coverage.
For the purposes of this discussion, the definition of "opera-
tor"' is most relevant. Independent contractors are expressly
"I While this consideration may seem tangential, it is mentioned as a blanket
heading for the following other factors: (1) contractors may be able to work more
safely than mining companies unfamiliar with such work, (2) promotion of employ-
ment for the general welfare of the economy, and (3) prevent mining companies
from leaving the industry rather than subjecting themselves to statutory liability
due to an inability to contract out work.
30 U.S.C.A. § 802(d) (West Supp. 1981).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(g) (West Supp. 1981).
- 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(h)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
- 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(a) (West Supp. 1981).
1981]
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included in the category of operators. This provision marked a
significant change from the 1969 Act which defined an operator
as any "owner, lessee, or other person who operates, controls, or
supervises a coal mine"'" and the 1966 Act which included in its
definition "the person, partnership, association, or corporation,
or subsidiary of a corporation operating a mine, and owning the
right to do so, and includes any agent thereof charged with the
responsibility for the operation of such mine."' 5
Under the 1969 Act, there was no consistent interpretation
of the former definition of "operator". Administrative and judi-
cial decisions varied as to whether independent contractors
could be penalized for the violations they committed." The
broader definition under the 1977 Act was adopted because of
these inconsistencies. At first glance, it appears that the new
-definition of operator should have put the "independent contrac-
tor issue" permanently to rest. However, legislative history of
the provisions shows that only one part of the problem was
resolved. The Senate Report states that:
Similarly, the definition of mine 'operator' is expanded to
include 'any independent contractor performing services or con-
struction at such mine.' It is the Committee's intent to thereby
include individuals or firms who are engaged in the extraction
process for the benefit of the owner or lessee of the property
and to make clear that the employees of such individuals or
firms are miners within the definition of the Federal Mine Safe-
ty and Health Act of 1977. In enforcing this Act, the Secretary
should be able to issue citations, notices, and orders, and the
Commission should be able to assess civil penalties against such
independent contractors as well as against the owner, operator,
or lessee of the mine. The Committee notes that this concept
has been approved by the federal circuit court in Bituminous
Coal Operators'Assn. v. Secretary of the Interior, 547 F.2d 240(C.A. 4, 1977).2
- 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(d) (West 1971) (amended 1977).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 721(c) (West 1971) (repealed 1977).
Though the original House bill for the 1977 Act did not include indepen-
dent contractors within the definition of "operator", the Senate bill did. Compare
H.R. 4287, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) with S. 717, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1977).
Ultimately, the Senate version was adopted in conference. For a detailed discus-
sion of the relevant case law, see infra notes 54-128 and accompanying text.
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH AMEND-
IdENTS ACT OF 1977 at 602 (1978) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 83
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The Conference Committee Report follows along the same
lines, noting that:
The Senate bill modified the definition of 'operator' to include
independent contractors performing services or construction at
a mine. This was intended to permit enforcement of the Act
against such independent contractors, and to permit the assess-
ment of penalties, the issuance of withdrawal orders, and the
imposition of civil and criminal sanctions against such contrac-
tors who may have continuing presence at the mine. The House
amendment had no comparable provision. The conference sub-
stitute conforms to the Senate Bill.'
The foregoing passages lend substantial support to the pro-
position that while the new definition permits holding indepen-
dent contractors liable under the law, it by no means precludes
the Secretary from taking enforcement action against the min-
ing companies. Moreover, the language mandates no particular
enforcement policy.
In addition to the foregoing, the Conference Report injects
another element into the calculus in that the Secretary is given
discretion as to which independent contractors will be liable
under the Act.2 Hence, while section 3(d) of the Act settles that
independent contractors may be liable for their violations, it by
no means settles under what circumstances they must be liable.
Resolution of this important question will have an important
effect on the enforcement of the Act since all statutory enforce-
ment actions are taken against "operators"." Only the party
I Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). In an amendment proposed by Senator
Hatch, "operator" was defined to include "any independent contractor therewith
and any agent thereof in cases where such contractor is charged with responsibi-
lity for the operation of such mine or for the supervision of the miners in such
mine." Id. at 832. This definition, which may have obviated the confusion over the
independant contractor issue, was not finally adopted by Congress.
I The Senate bill modified the definition of 'operator' to include in-
dependent contractors performing services or construction at a mine.
This was intended to permit enforcement of the Act against such in-
dependent contractors, and to permit the assessment of penalties, the
issuance of withdrawal orders, and the imposition of civil and criminal
sanctions against such contractors who may have a continuing presence
at the mine.
H.R. CONFERENCE REP. No. 655, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 3485 (emphasis added).
I See notes 7, 16, and 17 supra and accompanying text.
1981]
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who is deemed to be the operator will be subject to liability
under the Act.
B. Enforcement Mechanisms
There are three basic enforcement mechanisms available to
the Secretary to ensure compliance with the Act and regula-
tions: (1) citations, (2) orders, and (3) civil penalties. Citations are
the least severe sanction; orders the most severe. Civil penalties
are levied against the operator in both instances. The amount of
the penalty is computed by application of the statutory cri-
teria. 1 In all cases, enforcement action is taken against the
operator as determined by the Secretary. 2
Two types of citations can be issued under the 1977 Act. A
section 104(a) citation can be issued when a federal inspector
"believes that an operator.., has violated this Act, or any man-
datory health or safety standards, rule, order, or regulation pro-
mulgated pursuant to this Act."33 A section 104(d)(1) citation,34
often referred to as an "unwarrantable failure"35 citation, is
issued when a federal inspector finds a violation of the Act
which does not create an "imminent danger"," but which could
"significantly and substantially" 7 contribute to the cause and ef-
fect of a mine health or safety hazard. A prerequisite to the is-
I, 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(i) (West Supp. 1981).
30 U.S.C.A. § 820(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1981). But cf. 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(g)
(West Supp. 1981).
30 U.S.C.A. § 814(a) (West Supp. 1981).
u 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(d)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
"Unwarrantable failure" is not defined in the Act, but is interpreted to
mean "conditions or practices the operator knew or should have known existed
and therefore should have abated prior to discovery by the inspector." Consolida-
tion Coal Co. v. Secretary of Labor and United Mine Workers of America, MORG
79-70, 1 MSHC 2127, 2128 (1979) citing Zeigler Coal Co., 7 IBMA 280 (1977).
"'Imminent danger' means the existence of any condition or practice in a
coal or other mine which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm before such condition or practice can be abated." 30 U.S.C.A. §
802(j) (West Supp. 1981).
" There is some dispute as to precisely what is meant by "significant and
substantial". However, a recent administrative decision states that all violations
are significant and substantial except those which "pose no risk of injury at all"
and those which "pose a source of injury that only has a remote or speculative
chance of happening." Sunbeam Coal Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, PITT 79-210 et
seq. , 1 MSHC 2314, 2316 (1980), citing Alabama By-Products Corp., 7 IBMA 85
(1977).
[Vol. 83
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suance of a section 104(d)(1) citation is that the violation be caused
by an "unwarrantable failure" of the operator to comply with
the Act.
The type of citation issued has important legal consequences
for an operator. Where an operator is issued a section 104(a)
citation, if the alleged violation is abated within the time set in
the notice, the operator is not subject to further sanctions."
However, once an operator is cited under section 104(d)(1), the
operator is subject to a withdrawal order if, within ninety days
of the citation, a federal inspection discloses another "unwar-
rantable" violation, regardless of whether the original citation
was timely abated. 9
Withdrawal orders, which are authorized by five sections of
the Act, provide for harsher sanctions than citations." With-
drawal orders mandate the removal of all persons from the
affected area except those necessary to eliminate the condition."
Section 103 orders are issued to evacuate a mine accident site. 2
Orders are issued under section 104(b) upon failure of an
operator to abate a section 104(a) citation and remain effective
until abatement is completed.43 Section 104(d)(1) orders are
issued if any unwarrantable violation is found to exist within
ninety days of the issuance of a section 104(d)(1) citation. An
operator's records can be cleared only if an inspection of the en-
tire mine reveals no unwarrantable violations." Orders may be
issued under section 107 if an inspector finds the existence of an
"imminent danger". 5 Finally, a "pattern order" may be issued
pursuant to section 104(e)." This is the most stringent civil sanc-
" The operator would still be liable for the mandatory civil penalty assessed
for the violation. 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(a) (West Supp. 1981).
- 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(d)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
'D 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 813(d), 814(b), 814 (d), 814(e), 817 (West Supp. 1981).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(c) (West Supp. 1981).
" 30 U.S.C.A. § 813(j) (West Supp. 1981).
'3 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(b) (West Supp. 1981).
" Essentially, once an unwarrantable failure order has been issued, the
operator is subject to a succession of orders, skipping the citation stage and
resulting in somewhat of a chain reaction. 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(d)(1), (2) (West Supp.
1981).
'" This type of order need not be preceded by a citation. 30 U.S.C.A. § 817
(West Supp. 1981). See qenerally, note 36 supra.
1981]
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tion. Once an operator is deemed to have established a "pattern"
of significant and substantial violations the operator is notified
that such a pattern exists."' Following this notice, if another
"significant and substantial" violation is found within ninety
days, an order of withdrawal is issued and remains effective
until the violation is abated. Once this first order is issued, fur-
ther orders of withdrawal follow each time a "significant and
substantial" violation is found. The result is a chain of orders.
Only a complete inspection of the entire mine yielding no "signi-
ficant and substantial" violations will break the chain."
In addition to the foregoing enforcement mechanisms, a
mandatory civil penalty 9 is assessed for every violation cited in
a.citation or order.50 The penalty calculation is based on six sta-
tutory criteria: (1) the operator's history of previous violations,
(2) the appropriateness of the penalty to the size of the
operator's business, (3) the operator's negligence, (4) the effect of
the penalty on the operator's ability to stay in business, (5) the
gravity of the violation, and (6) the operator's good faith in abat-
ing the violation."1
C. Problems With the Application
of the Enforcement Mechanisms
If these enforcement actions are to be effective, it is sug-
gested that they should be taken against the party in the best
position to respond to them. The party who exercises direct con-
trol over the employees and area involved should be subject to
the penalities. If citations and orders are to foster a safety and
health consciousness, citing the mining company rather than the
contractor who caused the violation may be counter-productive.
Irhe contractor, free from penalty liability if not directly cited,
has no incentive to either abide by the regulations or to become
familiar with them. Consequently, the mining company becomes
strictly liable for conditions and practices which it cannot con-
" MSHA has not yet promulgated final rules interpreting this section of the
1977 Act. Proposed rules have been published. See 45 Fed. Reg. 54, 656 (1980).
30 U.S.C.A. § 814(e)(3) (West Supp. 1981).
, The Act also provides for criminal sanctions. They are not relevant here,
however, since they are only levied for knowing and willful violations, dependent
on a requisite state of mind. 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(d) (West Supp. 1981).
30 U.S.C.A. § 820(a) (West Supp. 1981).
51 30 U.S.C.A. § 820(i) (West Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 83
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol83/iss4/13
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS'
trol, resulting in the mining company acting as an insurer for
independent contractors.
Moreover, under the Act, the sanctions are progressive and
interrelated. Orders follow citations, and an operator can be pen-
alized for a pattern of violations. In this respect, independent
contractors assigned to the mining company are factored into
the mining company's history of violations. The result may be
that stricter sanctions are applied against the mining company
despite the fact that it was never responsible for those earlier
violations. Further, if the independent contractor's violations
are "significant and substantial" they will be considered as
significant and substantial violations of the mining company and
can eventually result in a pattern order against the mining com-
pany.
The argument favoring such strict liability is that the burden
is placed on the mining company to make certain that the inde-
pendent contractor does not violate the Act or regulations in the
first place. According to this view, the company has the "incen-
tive" 2 to instill safety consciousness in contractors and oversee
their operations. Since the contractor's violations will be
imputed to the mining company, the company has more reason
to exercise control over the contractor's work to avoid progres-
sively harsher sanctions.
The problem with such a strict liability theory may be best
illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume that Company contracts
with XYZ to build Company's first mine. With the exception of
one Company official, all personnel at the construction site are
employed-by XYZ. XYZ has its own work rules and the terms of
the contract preclude Company from exercising direction or con-
trol over XYZ's work force. The construction lasts six months
during which time federal inspectors issue numerous citations
and orders relating to the construction activity. Pursuantto
standard MSHA policy, Company is cited as the "operator".
Because these violations are attributable to Company, it
must bear the costs of the penalty assessments. Moreover, even
if Company is reimbursed by XYZ for the costs of the penalties,
Company's future penalty assessment will be inflated because of
2 However, the avoidance of strict liability for the violations of its contrac-
tors only provides a negative incentive for the mining company.
19811
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the prior history of violations which were actually caused by
XYZ. Thus Company will begin operations with an extensive
history of prior violations which will subject Company to pro-
gressive sanctions. It is even possible that Company can be
deemed to have a "pattern" of violations upon its first citation.
The possibility of the imposition of unfair and undue penalties is
not the only problem. Unexperienced and non-expert supervi-
sion may result. It is unrealistic to expect Company to supervise
XYZ. The very purpose for hiring XYZ was that Company lacked
the expertise to perform the construction or services.0
IV. CASES BEFORE THE AGENCY AND THE COURTS
A. Statutory Construction of the Earlier Acts
Cases involving independent contractor violations first
arose under the 1969 Coal Act. In two early decisions, the Inter-
ior Board of Mine Operations Appeals5 held that an independent
contractor was an "operator" within the meaning of section 3(d)
of the 1969 Act,5 and that as an "operator", the contractor, not
I There are two key statutory provisions which impact upon the indepen-
dent contractor issue. Section 104(g)(2) requires miners idled by a withdrawal
order to be compensated for their lost time. 30 U.S.C.A. § 814(g)(2) (West Supp.
1981). Section 116 requires mine operators to provide paid safety and health train-
ing for miners, including initial training, annual refresher training, hazard train-
ing and operator certification that training has been completed. 30 U.S.C.A. § 825
(West Supp. 1981).
Payment for idle time becomes important in the situation where an indepen-
dent contractor violation results in a withdrawal order issued to the mining com-
pany. The operator to whom the order is issued is technically liable to pay for the
idle time. As a practical matter, however, this probably would not occur. More
importantly, however, if the order affects an area occupied by the mining com-
pany's employees as well as the independent contractor's employees, the mining
company will be forced to pay its own employees for idle time due to no fault of
its own.
The training requirements create another troublesome situation. Under the
implementing regulations, a mining company is required to train "non-employees"
which includes training employees of independent contractors. 30 C.F.R. § 48
(1980). While these regulations have been upheld by the Third Circuit, they point
out the administrative confusion inherent in not functionally distinguishing con-
tractors from the mining companies. National Industrial Sand Corp. v. Marshall,
601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979).
" The predecessor of the current Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission [hereinafter the Board].
' Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83
Stat. 742 (1980).
[Vol. 83
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the mining company, was liable for the construction company's
violations of mandatory health and safety standards.-
In Affinity Mining Co., the Board maintained that respon-
sibility for violations was a factual determination based on a
number of considerations including whose employees committed
the violation, whose employees were exposed to the hazards,
and which party had control over the work area involved. The
Board added that, ". . . while more than one person may fall
technically within the definition of 'operator', only one responsi-
ble for the violation and the safety of employees can be the per-
son [against whom enforcement action is taken]. ' 57 An
owner/operator would not be immune from liability, however,
where it "materially abetted violations of its independent con-
tractors.""8
In another ca se, 9 the Board dismissed a proceeding against
a mining company where the company had a contract with an
independent contractor which indicated "on its face that [the
company] was not responsible for the health and safety of the
personnel at the mine"6 and the goverment had no evidence to
the contrary."
The Affinity rule was soon modified. In NICOA v. Brennan,2
the court held that for purposes of Title IV of the 1969 Act, per-
taining to black lung compensation, independent contractor con-
struction companies did not fall within the definition of "oper-
ator." Following the district court's lead, the Board began to
modify its position in subsequent cases. In Peggs Run Coal Co.,
Inc., 3 it held that a mining company could be held liable for
violations of its contractors if the violation endangered mining
company employees and the mining company could have pre-
14 Affinity Mining Co., 2 IBMA 57 (1973) (construing 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(d)
(West 1971) (amended 1977)) [hereinafter Affinity]; Wilson v. Laurel Shaft Constr.
Co., 1 IBMA 217 (1972) (construing 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(d) (West 1971) (amended
1977)).
', Affinity, supra note 56 at 60.
Id. at 61.
' Ohio Mining Co., 4 IBMA 121 (1975).
Id. at 125.
But see Rushton Mining Co., 5 IBMA 367, 369 (1975).
62 372 F. Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter NICOA].
5 IBMA 175 (1975).
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vented the violation with a "minimum of diligence".' This new
standard was affirmed in West Freedom Mining Corp.,5 where
the operator would have been able to prevent a violation with a
"minimum of effort".6
Eventually, in a declaratory judgment action brought by the
Association of Bituminous Contractors, the Affinity rule was
struck down."7 The district court declared that construction com-
panies were not operators under the 1969 Act, and hence could
not be cited for violations. However, the District of Columbia
Circuit determined that the Secretary could cite the mining
companies for the violations of the contractors.
To implement the district court's decision, MESA 8 issued an
unpublished internal policy memoranda on June 3, 1975 to all
MESA district managers directing that citations be issued only
to coal mining companies or lessees for violations of the 1969
Act. Additionally, on June 17, 1975, MESA district managers
were directed, in connection with all unresolved civil penalty
cases, to issue to the mining companies all notices and orders
previously issued to contractors.
The Secretary of the Interior appealed the ABC case, but in
the interim, issued Secretarial Order No. 2977.69 The order,
" Id. at 183.
5 IBMA 329 (1975).
Id. at 335. See also ARMCO Steel Corp., 6 IBMA 64 (1976).
6? Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Morton, No. 74-1058 (D.D.C.
May 23, 1975).
See note 54 supra.
69 Secretarial Order No. 2977 was issued by Acting Secretary Frizell and
reads as follows:
Subject: Issuance of citations to operators pursuant to the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
Sec. 1 Purpose. (a) The purpose of this order is to direct Mining
Enforcement and Safety Administration to continue to inspect construc-
tion work conducted on coal mine property, and to issue appropriate
citations for violations of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969 and/or for hazardous conditions or practices committed andlor
created by contractors on such property on and after May 24, 1975 to
the operator of the coal mine on whose behalf the contractor is perform-
ing work.
(b) This order is issued to comply with the declaratory judgement order
in Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Rogers C. B. Morton,
Secretary of the Interior, Civil Action No. 1058-74, U.S. District Court
[Vol. 83
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issued on August 21, 1975, but retroactive to May 24, 1975, offi-
cially set forth a departmental policy in compliance with ABC.
Accordingly, mine operators were to be charged with their con-
tractor's violations.
Meanwhile, on August 4, 1975, Republic Steel Corp., a mine
owner, received a withdrawal order for failing to collect
respirable dust samples for employees of its independent con-
tractor. Republic appealed for review of the order on the
strength of the Board's Affinity" decision. An Administrative
Law Judge agreed with Republic, holding that Republic was not
the responsible party.7" On appeal, the Board reversed.72 The
Board determined that Secretarial Order 2977 was binding upon
the Board itself and therefore, under the departmental policy,
"the owner or lessee of a coal mine is the sole party to be held
absolutely liable for violations of the mandatory standards com-
mitted by a coal mine construction contractor regardless of the
circumstances."73
At this point, with Secretarial Order 2977 still in effect, the
Bituminous Coal Operators' Association sought declaratory
relief from the Secretary's order in federal district court in
Virginia. The court dismissed the suit and held that the order
was valid on the theory that independent contractors were "sta-
tutory agents" of owner/operators. Consequently, it was proper
to hold mining companies vicariously liable for the statutory
violations of their agents, the independent contractors."
for the District of Columbia, and to carry out the mandate of Congress
announced in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 to
enforce the provisions of the Act in all coal mines subject to the Act.
See. 2 Effective Date. This order shall be effective as of May 24, 1975.
This order will remain in effect until rescinded by subsequent order of
the Secretary.
,0 Affinity, supra note 56.
" Republic Steel Corp., No. MORG 76-21 (1975).
72 5 IBMA 306 (1975), rev'd 581 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
Republic].
,1 5 IBMA at 310-11 (emphasis added). See also Secretary of Labor v. U.S.
Steel Corp., PITT 76X232-P and 76X235-P, 1 MSHC 2278 (1980) and Webster
County Coal Corp., 7 IBMA 264 (1977) (mining company held liable despite
absence of its own negligence for contractor's violations resulting in fatality).
"' Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, Inc. v. Hathaway, 406 F. Supp.
371 (W.D. Va. 1975), affd sub nom. Bituminous Coal Operators' Association, Inc.
v. Secretary of the Interior, 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter BCOA].
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In 1977, three independent contractor cases were pending in
the courts of appeals. Republic5 and ABC"6 were pending in the
District of Columbia Circuit, while BCOA77 was pending in the
Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit adopted a position midway between the
district court's decision in ABC and the Board's early decisions. 8
The appellate court rejected the earlier position of the NICOA
case79 reading it as limited to liability for black lung compensation. 0
Rather, the court reasoned that since the 1969 Act defined
"operator" to include "other persons" who controlled or supervised
a coal mine, an independent contractor who "exercises, controls and
supervises over a specific area of land while it is constructing one of
the facilities mentioned in the Act, is functioning as an operator of a
coal mine." However, "[b]ecause the definition of operator also in-
cludes the owner or lessee, we further hold that the Secretary can im-
pose liability on a mining company for a construction company's
violation." 8' The court also stated that a contractor could be con-
sidered a statutory agent of the mining company. "
The result of the Fourth Circuit's decision was that a mining
company and an independent contractor could be held jointly and
severally liable for violations of the contractor. The court did,
however, expressly reserve decision on how, and according to what
criteria, liability was to be allocated between the parties."
Republic and ABC were decided simultaneously. In ABC,
the appellate court, reversing the district court, held that "an
independent company engaged to do construction work at a coal
mine is with respect to his contractual work an 'operator of a
coal mine' and is liable for violating mandatory health and safety
regulations imposed in accordance with the Act."'" It was fur-
' Republic, supra note 72.
78 ABC, supra note 67.
7 BCOA, supra note 74.
78 547 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1977).
NICOA, supra note 62.
547 F.2d at 245.
, Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that this responsibiilty could "best be
initiated by the Secretary through regulations and adjudication."
581 F.2d 853, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 83
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ther noted that "[ilt is not a stretching of the statute to hold that
companies who profess to be as independent of the coal mine
owners as these construction companies purport to be, do con-
trol and supervise the construction work they have contracted
to perform over the area where they are working."85 The court
reasoned that holding owners liable would be inefficient because
it would force them to constantly interfere in the work of the
contractors in order to minimize their own liability.
In Republic, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that
Republic Steel was cited in accordance with Secretarial Order
2977 which relied on the district court's decision in ABC. Since
ABC was now reversed, the court remanded Republic to the
Board," hastening to add that the matter was now left to the
discretion of the Secretary. 7
The Board may then determine what enforcement course it will
follow: whether to proceed, as in the past, only against construc-
tion contractors and therefore dismiss the present action
against Republic; or to proceed against Republic on the basis of
the Board's own interpretation of how best to effectuate the
purposes of the Act.'
On remand, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission89 held that "as a matter of law under the 1969 Act
an owner of a coal mine can be held responsible for any viola-
tions of the Act committed by its contractors,"9 regardless of
who creates the danger and whether the owner was in a position
to prevent the violations. The Commission went on to say that:
A mine owner cannot be allowed to exonerate itself from its
statutory responsibility for the safety and health of miners
merely by establishing a private contractual relationship in
which miners are not its employees and the ability to control
the safety of its workplace is restricted."
Id. at 862-62 (emphasis in original).
Since the Board was disassembled by the 1977 Act, the case was actually
remanded to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, the
Board's successor.
581 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id. at 870.
' Hereinafter the Commission.
Secretary of Labor v. Republic Steel Corp., MORG 76-21 and 76X95-P, 1
MSHC 2002, 2005 (1975) [hereinafter Republic III.
11 Id. at 2006.
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The Commission reserved comment on the scope of its review of
Secretarial discretion in deciding which party to hold liable.2
In an extremely persuasive dissent, Commissioner Backley
proposed a standard, based on a theory of functional control, for
determining whom to cite under the Act:
I am convinced that the Act's purpose of assuring the health
and safety of miners can best be accomplished by placing the
responsibility for their health and safety on the person most
able to prevent violations or hazards and to correct them
quickly should they occur. In most situations that person would
be the party who controls or supervises the work activity in
that portion of the mine where the violation or hazard
occurred.93
Moreover, Backley criticized the majority view that owners
contract out work to escape liability, noting that work is con-
tracted out because it is work that the owner does not have the
expertise to perform. The thrust of the Backley position is that
absolute liability of the operator is irrational; the party with the
ability to assure safety should be the party cited.
In a companion case, Secretary of Labor v. Cowin & Co.,9
the Secretary's issuance of an imminent danger order against an
independent contractor was upheld. The Commission concluded
that it was permissible to cite a contractor under the 1969 Act,
and in this instance, Cowin was deemed an "operator" under the
Act.9" It should be noted that in deciding Republic 11 and Cowin,
the Commission stated that the 1977 Act was not in issue.00
'Id.
Id. at 2009.
, BARB 74-259, 1 MSHC 2010 (1979) [hereinafter Cowin].
'5 In another case involving the same contractor, the Fourth Circuit held
that Cowin, as an independent contractor, could not be held liable as an agent of a
mining company under § 109(c) of the 1969 Act and remanded the case to the
Commission for a determination as to whether Cowin was an "operator" under §
109(a) of the 1969 Act. Cowin and Co., Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Comm'n No. 78-1825 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 1979), reprinted in 1 MSHC 2257
(1979) (construing 30 U.S.C.A. § 819 (West 1971) (amended 1977)).
Republic II, supra note 90, at 2003 n.1.
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B. Statutory Construction of the 1977 Act
The first two cases to arise under the 1977 Act on the inde-
pendent contractor issue were Monterey Coal Co. v. Secretary
of Labor,97 and Secretary of Labor v. Old Ben Co." In Monterey
Coal, an Administrative Law Judge held that because the
legislative history of the 1977 Act endorsed the Fourth Circuit's
decision in BCOA," Congress must have meant that "the
Secretary is not forced to cite mining company owner/operators
for violations caused by independent contractors but, rather,
may cite the independent contractors.""' The Administrative
Law Judge went on to say:
In my view, this statute, comparing it with the 1969 Act, is
clear on its face. It creates an express liability for independent
contractors, where formerly this could only be inferred. In so
doing, the legislature, in effect, seems to have removed contrac-
tors from a presumed status of that of agent. The statute would
make little sense otherwise because the positions of agent and
independent contractor are mutually exclusive. If Congress had
intended that contractors be held liable as agents of the owner
or lessee, the statute would surely have contained different
language."'
The citations against Monterey Coal were vacated and strict
liability of operators was rejected. While owners or lessees
could be held liable for the violations of their independent con-
tractors, such a finding would have to be "justified by the condi-
tions and circumstances,"'0 2 by determining who had supervision
over affected workers and who controlled the pertinent work
17 HOPE 78-469 through 78-476 (Feb. 15, 1979), rev'd 1 MSHC 2232 (1979), ap-
peal dismissed sub nom. Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Comm'n 635 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1980) (Commission's remand to ALJ for
further proceedings to determine if a violation occurred held not a final order
reviewable under 30 U.S.C.A. § 816(a)(1) (West Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Monterey
Coal].
1 FMSHRC 271 (1979), affd in par4 rev'd in part 1 MSHC 2177 (1979), affd
sub nom. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n 2
MSHC 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Old Ben].
BCOA, supra note 74.
,C HOPE 78-469 through 78-476, slip. op. at 8 (Feb. 15, 1979).
,' Id. at 9.
,o2 Id. at 10.
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environment. Furthermore, since an absolute liability theory
was rejected, the Administrative Law Judge also refused to
adopt the Secretary's argument that MSHA had unfettered dis-
cretion in deciding whom to cite.
In Old Ben,"' the presiding Administrative Law Judge
reached an opposite result. The Judge interpreted the Commis-
sion's decisions in Republic I10 and Cowin1' as applicable to the
1977 Act and found "[Tihe fact that a contractor is an operator
by explicit statutory language rather than by construction,
should logically not limit the Secretary's discretion. The legis-
lative history does not support [Old Ben's] position that Con-
gress intended to limit or withdraw the liability of coal mine
operators for acts or omissions of independent contractors."',"
Both Old Ben and Monterey Coal were appealed to the Com-
mission. A decision in Old Ben was issued in October 1979."7 The
Commission ruled that mining companies could be held abso-
lutely liable for violations of independent contractors as a mat-
ter of law. Regarding the express inclusion of contractors in sec-
tion 3(d), 18 the Commission ruled that:
On its face, the additional language in the 1977 Act's definition
of 'operator' does not affect the question of an owner's respon-
sibility for contractor violations. Rather, the amendment simply
appears to settle an uncertainity that arose under the 1969 Act,
i.e., whether certain contractors are 'operators' within the
meaning of the Act."
The Commission stated, however, that this holding did not
dilute an independent contractor's duty to comply with federal
law or regulations, or affect its liability for its own violations. "'
While at first glance, it would appear that this decision does
not substantially differ from the Commission's decision in
Republic II, the two cases should be distinguished. In Republic
103 Old Ben, supra note 98.
10, Republic II, supra note 90.
,05 Cowin, supra note 94.
106 1 FMSHRC 271, 273 (1979).
101 1 MSHC 2177 (1979).
'0' 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(d) (West Supp. 1981).
1 1 MSHC at 2178 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 2179.
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II,.. the Commission implied that the Secretary of Interior's
discretion as to whom to cite was outside the scope of review,
while in Old Ben it is expressly stated that the Commission may
review the Secretary of Labor's discretion under the 1977 legis-
lative scheme, the standard of review being whether the Secre-
tary acts in conformance with the purposes and policies of the
1977 Act.'
There is an important caveat to the Commission's opinion.
The Commission reasoned that it was willing to tolerate the
Secretary's blanket enforcment of the Act against mining com-
panies as an interim policy pending the final promulgation of
regulations for citing contractors directly.'
We note that the interim policy being pursued by the Secretary
is not in line with the view expressed in his proposed 1977 Act.
Also, we have doubts concerning the necessity of the Secre-
tary's blanket 'owners only' enforcement policy even on an
interim basis. In many circumstances, as in the present case, it
should be evident to an inspector at the time that he issues a
citation or order that an identifiable contractor created a
violative condition and is in the best position to eliminate the
hazard and prevent it from recurring. Thus, we fail to see the
overriding need for adherence to a uniform policy in instances
where it is clear that proceeding against a contractor is a more
effective method of protecting the safety and health of miners.
Nevertheless, we recognize that it takes some time for the
development of new policies and procedures by a department
newly assigned the enforcement of a major program designed
to protect the health and safety of miners.
If the Secretary unduly prolongs a policy that prohibits direct
enforcement of the Act against contractors, he will be disregard-
ing the intent of Congress. In view of the Secretary's express
recognition of the wisdom and effectiveness of subjecting con-
tractors to direct enforcement, continuation of a policy that
forecloses such enforcement will provide evidence that the cur-
rent policy is grounded solely on improper consideration of
administrative convenience, a basis that would not be consis-
Republic II, supra note 90.
"' 1 MSHC at 2180.
1 MSHC at 2181.
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tent with the Act's purpose and policies. The ability to proceed
against owners for contractor violations was intended to pro-
vide an effective tool for protecting the safety and health of
miners. To use this tool as a mere administrative expedient
would be an abuse."'
Commissioner Backley dissented on the ground that
deference to the agency was innappropriate since the Secre-
tary's enforcement policy was "ill-founded"." 5 He chastised the
Commission for deferring to Secretarial discretion where admin-
istrative convenience Was the sole rationale for a particular
policy and where the policy was at the expense of safety.
Backley again proposed a functional control/supervision test for
making a factual determination as to where to assign liability."'
Following the Old Ben decision, Monterey Coal"7 was sum-
marily decided with reference to Old Ben. Reversing the deci-
sion of the Administrative Law Judge below, the company was
held liable for the violation of its independent contractor.
Three cases have been decided since Old Ben. In Secretary
of Labor v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Co., 8 Adminis-
trative Law Judge Koutras found that he was constrained by
Old Ben to hold a mine operator liable "irrespective of the fact
that I may disagree with the Commission's rationale, or am in
accord with Commission Backley's well-reasoned dissents." 9 At
least to a certain extent, however, Koutras did circumvent the
Old Ben ruling in his assessment of penalities against the mining
company. He mitigated the penalties, stated that the owner
"should not bear the burden of any increased assessments based
on [the contractor's] negligence."'20
In two other cases, Administrative Law Judges were faced
with approving settlement agreements. In Secretary of Labor v.
Central Premix Concrete Co., 2' the Administrative Law Judge
114 Id.
"I Id. Commissioner Backley implied that the Secretary was taking an
unduly long time to promulgate regulations.
"' See note 93 supra and accompanying text.
x' See note 97 supra.
2 FMSHRC 311 (1980).
"' Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 330-31.
121 Nos. DENV 79-62-PM and 79-126-PM, 1 MSHC 2110 (1979).
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noted that although a mining company cannot defend against an
independent contractor violation on that basis alone, it could be
a mitigation factor in a penalty assessment. In Secretary of
Labor v. Consolidation Coal Co., the Administrative Law
Judge denied enforcement of a settlement agreement maintain-
ing that MSHA's enforcment policies were senseless.
Once again the parties insult our sensibilities and intelligence
with a proposal to settle with a wrist slap three extremely
serious violations that created a hazard of three or more
fatalities or permanently disabling injuries. The excuse offered
is so outrageous as to be mind boggling.
MSHA flouts the law by refusing to prosecute independent con-
tractors. As a result, those contractors flout the law with im-
munity. OSHA, remember, cannot touch them because they are
under the 'protection' of MSHA.
MSHA then 'prosecutes' the operator who pleads the unfairness
of holding him responsible while the real culprit goes free. This
plea is appealing to the ears of the assessment office, the
solicitor and so far the Commission.
As a result, the operator gets off with a token assessment, the
policy of non-enforcement proliferates and the death and injury
rate among miners employed by independent contractors soars.
This charade has got to stop.'"
In recent dicta, the Third Circuit discussed when indepen-
dent contractors should be "operators" for the purpose of
assigning liability for violations.'24 The National Industrial Sand
Corp. v. Marshall [NISA] court favored a "control/super-
vision""" test to determine when a contractor is the responsible
operator. The court reasoned that only a contractor with a sub-
stantial degree of participation, involvement and contact with
the mine should be cited. 2 ' The court did not address the degree
of liability to be imposed on contractors, nor whether a con-
tractor who is deemed an operator for enforcement purposes
must be cited for its violations.
'12No. WEVA 80-145 (FMSHRC April 2, 1981).
123 Id.
' National Industrial Sand Corp. v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979)
[hereinafter NISA].
12 Id. at 701.
12 Id.
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The NISA decision also alluded to the Secretary's pending
draft regulations for identifying contractors as operators, ' and
stated that a control/supervision standard would be appreciated.
The court noted, for instance, that it was troubled by the pro-
spect of small companies having to train employees of special-
ized contractors who were hired for the very reason of being
specialists. '
V. THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
A review of the foregoing development of case law under-
scores the difficulties inherent in enforcing the 1977 Act in the
most efficacious fashion regarding independent contractors.
Although the courts and the agency acknowledge that contrac-
tors may indeed be cited for their violations, no guidelines are
set as to whether or not they shall be cited in any particular
case.
The importance of the Secretary's role in making the initial
enforcement decision cannot be overlooked. In Old Ben, the
Commission allowed the Secretary to follow a blanket policy of
citing mining companies, pending adoption of final rules for
citing contractors directly.
The Secretary initially issued draft proposed regulations on
October 23, 1978. '29 Following a comment period, proposed
regulations were published in the Federal Register on August 14,
1979.10
In the draft regulations, MSHA proposed a system for iden-
tifying contractors who would be considered "operators". How-
ever, MSHA reserved the right to hold a contractor and a min-
ing company jointly and severally liable. Under the draft
scheme, a contractor would be identified as an operator based on
four criteria: (1) whether the work to be performed was "major"
work,' 1 (2) whether the contractor had a right of control over its
employees or those of its subcontractors, (3) whether the con-
1 See notes 129-36 infra and accompanying text.
1,8 NISA, supra note 124, at 703-07.
12 43 Fed. Reg. 50,716 (1978) (advanced notice of proposed rulemaking)
[hereinafter cited as Draft Regs.].
12 44 Fed. Reg. 47,746 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Regs.].
,31 Draft Regs., supra note 129, at § 45.4.
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tractor was scheduled to have a "continuing presence", ' and (4)
whether the contractor was truly independent and not subject
to the company's control. 3 '
A procedure to identify contractors was set forth as follows.
The contractor and operator would jointly or separately submit
information required by the regulations to MSHA."' MSHA
would then have sixty days to notify the parties as to whether
the contractor was an "operator". '35 If identified as an
"operator", the contractor would be assigned an identification
number for that job only, and the contractor would have to file a
legal identity report with MSHA.
The draft rules were sharply criticized. Criticism focused
primarily on the six month "continuing presence" requirements.
Also, there were charges that the term "major work" was too
vague to be useful. Moreover, many commenting parties ob-
jected to a determination of "operator" status on a job-by-job
basis, arguing that it would involve excessive paperwork and
would yield inconsistent results. '36
Although various changes were incorporated in the pro-
posed regulations, certain fundamental concepts of the draft
rules were retained. In determining "operator" status, emphasis
was shifted away from the "major work" and "continuing pre-
sence" criteria. Under the proposed rules the critical considera-
tion was control over the area of the mine where the work is
being performed.37 When inquiring into control, however, the
Secretary was still permitted to consider whether the contrac-
tor was engaged in "major work" and whether it had a "continu-
ing presence". ' The proposed regulations defined "major work"
as work which is "substantial in nature",39 while the criteria for
132 Id.
133 Id.
' Draft Regs., supra note 129, at § 45.3.
'1 Draft Regs., supra note 129, at § 45.5.
' Under the draft regulations, a contractor could be an "operator" at one
mine site but not at another. See Draft Regs., supra note 129, at § 45.4. See also
44 Fed. Reg. at 47,746-51.
I" Proposed Regs., supra note 130, at § 45.4, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
47,752.
I, !d.
11 Id. at § 45.2(d).
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''continuing presence" was reduced from six months to three
months.'
In its discussion of the proposed rules, MSHA argued that
control over the work area provided was the best determinant
of operator status."' Industry has attacked this view. The pri-
mary criticism of MSHA's approach was that many contractors
are quite mobile and their employees are dispersed on mine pro-
perty. Consequently, there is no particular area over which the
contractor has control."' Another potential flaw in the proposed
regulations was the three month continuing presence require-
ment. In many instances, contractors are hired on a long term
contract, but are actually present only for short, intermittent
periods."3 Additionally, contractors may be hired on an "as
needed" basis.' Neither of these contracts would satisfy the
continuing presence requirement. Nevertheless, the indepen-
dent contractor's employees may be free from mining company
supervision due to the nature of their work. In this context, a
test which determines control over the work itself, rather than
control over the area, would be preferable.
On the other hand, it could be argued that it is adminis-
tratively futile to attempt to cite contractors who have such a
fleeting presence. In this respect, it would be preferable to hold
the mining company liable and have the company exert pressure
on the contractors. It should be noted, however, that in some cir-
cumstances this would be virtually impossible. In the case of a
large mine, for example, the seemingly impossible task of
overseeing the activities of hundreds of contractors would be
thrust upon the mining company.
Another criticism leveled against the "continuing presence"
requirement was that many contractors could totally escape
O Id. at § 45.2(e).
14 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 47,747.
", For example, a contractor hired to do repair work may have several
employees at the mine site at a given point, each of whom moves from machine to
machine. While it is arguable that "control" can be interpreted as controlling the
area around each machine operated by the contractor's employees, such a con-
struction would strain plain meaning.
', An example of an "intermittent" contractor is the electrical contractor
who comes in every several months to check equipment.
'" An example of an "as needed" contractor is the haulage contractor whose
contract calls for haulage services only when they are needed.
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liability by contracting for short term jobs. Since operator
status was to be determined on a job-by-job basis, contractors
could seek jobs just short of three months.
The "continuing presence" requirement could have resulted
in even more serious problems. It could have adversely affected
specialized contractors which do only short term work. Mining
companies facing strict liability might have decided to perform
their own short term work, rather than employ a specialized
contractor. This could have actually impeded the safety and
health goals of the 1977 Act. Small specialized contractors
whose expertise in a specific area is greater than a mining com-
pany's might have been forced out of business. Consequently,
the lesser qualified mining company would have ended up doing
short term, specialized work for which it would otherwise
employ a contractor.
It has been argued that administrative convenience of the
Secretary should outweigh the need to directly penalize smaller,
short term contractors. In lieu of direct penalization, the mining
company can make contractual arrangements with the contrac-
tors for reimbursement of penalties. Therefore, even though the
mining company would be officially cited, it would have a civil
remedy to recover the amount of the penalty.
However, there are two problems with this view: (1) it does
not promote mine safety, and (2) it results in excessive litigation.
If the 1977 Act is to be remedial, the focus of enforcement
should be to prevent violations. Involving extraneous parties to
enforce mandatory health and safety standards, particularly
where the mining company lacks effective control over the par-
ties, contravenes the ultimate utility of enforcement protection
of health and safety.
Another challenge lodged against the proposed rules was
that they would have created a burdensome identification
scheme. The proposed rules would have established a system
akin to that of the draft rules. Under the proposed rules, the
contractor and the company would apply to MSHA for contrac-
tor operator status. MSHA then would have only thirty days
"I Proposed Regs., supra note 130, at § 45.3, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. at
47,752.
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to reply.14 This would have been an undue administrative delay
on beginning jobs. Moreover, a contractor might have had
numerous applications pending on different jobs and would have
been unable to begin work knowing its status at each particular
job.14 7
Whether the proposed regulations would have enhanced
safety and health in the mines is disputed. While those contrac-
tors having operator status have incentive to comply with
health and safety standards at particular jobs, they may not feel
compelled to do so where they are not identified as operators.
For those contractors who perform only "non-operator" type
work, there is no incentive at all to become familiar with the
regulations and to train their employees accordingly. Despite
that it might be extremely difficult for the mining company to
assure the expeditious abatement of citations and orders,"'
MSHA seemed satisfied because it clearly had a party from
whom it could collect penalties."9 MSHA was satisfied to use the
statute punitively, rather than to foster safety and health.
The proposed rules were also attacked for retaining the
discretionary joint and several liability rule.' Mining companies
still would not have been able to rely on their contractors to
bear the burden of their noncompliance with regulations. The
proposed rules provided that the company could still be held
liable despite a lack of control. The argument favoring this pro-
vision is that operators should not be able to "wash their hands"
of their contractors' operations, giving them an incentive to
make their contractors comply with the federal regulations. It
also assures MSHA of a party from whom to collect penalties.
... Id. at § 45.5(a).
"I At this point, MSHA still consistently refused to identify individual con-
tractors as operators across the board for work performed at different job sites.
"' This is especially true since the contractor has its own work practices
with the mining company busy with its own operations.
... It is arguable that the Secretary has the discretion to enforce the law in
this manner and leave it to the parties to establish a method to encourage safety.
However, there are three responses to this view: (1) for large companies it may be
more cost effective just to pay penalties as opposed to investing, with each con-
tractor, in complicated arrangements to oversee work; (2) as a practical matter, it
will be very difficult for a company to supervise the operation of contractors. If
forced to do so, it would not be worth the cost to hire contractors, which could
have deleterious economic implications in an already depressed industry; and (3)
MTSHA should not pass its responsibility to enforce the law to private parties.
"5 See notes 97-100 supra and accompanying text.
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Despite the express inclusion of independent contractors as
operators in the 1977 Act, a cohesive, efficacious policy dealing
with contractor violations has not been established. The proposed
regulations created new problems and lacked a unitary criteria
to provide adequate notice to companies and contractors of their
respective responsibilities. Furthermore, the proposed regula-
tions failed to guide federal inspectors in performing their
duties at the mine site. Consequently, an alternative approach to
the issue was warranted.
VI. FINAL REGULATIONS
On July 1, 1980, MSHA promulgated final regulations on
citing independent contractors directly for their violations. 5 '
The final regulations abandoned the "continuing presence" '52
and "major work"' " concepts, making it more likely that inde-
pendent contractors will be held accountable for their violations
of the Act, standards and regulations.' Interpreting the final
regulations, MSHA has instructed its "inspectors [to] cite in-
dependent contractors for violations, committed by them or
their employees, of provisions of the Act, standards or regula-
tions which are applicable to independent contractors. 55
Under the new regulations, however:
MSHA's general enforcement policy regarding indepen-
dent contractors does not change the basic compliance
responsibilities of production-operators. Production-
operators are subject to all provisions of the Act, stan-
dards and regulations which are applicable to their min-
ing operation. This overall compliance responsibility of
production-operators includes assuring compliance with
the standards and regulations which apply to the work
being performed by independent contractors at the
mine. As a result, independent contractors and produc-
'5' 30 C.F.R. § 45 (1980).
£2 See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
, See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
'u 45 Fed. Reg. 44,497 (1980) (MSHA's enforcement policy and guidelines for
independent contractors state, "Effective immediately, the general policy of the
Mine Safety and Health Administration ... is to issue citations and, where appro-
priate, orders to independent contractors for their violations of provisions of the
Act, standards or regulations that are applicable to independent contractors:').
1ss Id.
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tion-operators both are responsible for compliance with
the provisions of the Act, standards and regulations
applicable to the work being performed by independent
contractors.
This 'overlapping' compliance responsibility of indepen-
dent contractors and production operators means that
there may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to
issue citations or orders to both the independent con-
tractor and the production-operator for a violation." 6
MSHA's enforcement guidelines identify at least five situa-
tions where the mining company will be cited for violations com-
mitted by its independent contractors:
(1) where the mining company contributes to the occurrence
of a violation by act or omission,
(2) where the mining company contributes to the continued
existence of a violation by act or ommission,
(3) where a mining company's employees are exposed to the
hazard,
(4) where the mining company has control over the condition
in need of abatement, and
(5) where the independent contractor is not fully able to
assume compliance responsibilities. 7
These five situations, however, are by no means exhaustive
of when a mining company may be cited for the violations of its
independent contractors. " Hence, the assignment of liability
between companies is still an open question. Consequently, the
adequacy of MSHA's new enforcement policy is questionable.
VII. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR PROBLEM
Since the goal of the 1977 Act is to place the health and
safety of miners above other considerations,"9 MSHA's policy on
citing independent contractors should reflect the most func-
tional and expedient method of promoting compliance with man-
156 Id.
157 Id.
15 See note 156 supra and accompany text.
' ' 30 U.S.C.A. § 801(a) (West Supp. 1981).
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datory standards. A controllsupervision test"'0 for assigning
liability is the most viable method by which the overriding goal
of the miners' safety and health can best be reached. This test
would necessarily entail making the party responsible for the
creation of the health or safety hazard, and with the ability to
timely abate those hazards, liable for them.
Such a program could be implemented in the following man-
ner. First, the party controlling the work and supervising the
employees performing that work should have primary respon-
sibility for violations of the Act, standards and regulations. To
determine who is in control, the inspector at the mine site would
be required to make a realistic assessment, based on the nature
of the work being performed. This can be easily accomplished
since the inspector is accompanied by company officials and a
representative of the miners. Hence, a simple question will
resolve whose employees are performing the work. Moreover,
contractor employees are often generally identifiable by their
uniforms, the names on the equipment they use or even by the
type of work being done.
Second, all independent contractors interested in doing mine
related work would be required to apply for an identification
number.16" ' Contractors would thereby establish a direct relation-
ship with MSHA. Consequently, notice of applicable regulations
could be better effectuated. 6 '
This system would have several productive results. First,
each contractor would have notice of applicable regulations.
Second, the job-by-job determination of "operator" status, with
10 Liability should be predicated upon the theory that the party in control of
the actual work and with direct supervisory control of the employees performing
the work is in the best position to prevent violations. This party should be
obligated to imbue employees with the health and safety consciousness essential
to making the mines a safer place to work.
1"1 The final regulations adopted by MSHA establishes a registration system
whereby independent contractors may obtain a permanent MSHA identification
number. Since the regulation is drafted only in the permissive, contractors are
not required to have a permanent number. Contractors electing not to obtain a
permanent number can be determined to have "operator" status only on a job-by-
job basis. This method is inconsistent with a controlisupervision test for liability
since it increases the likelihood that an independent contractor can escape liabi-
lity for its violations. See 30 C.F.R. § 45.3 (1980).
1 2 A mining company choosing to work with a non-registered contractor
would assume the risk of being held liable for the non-registered contractor's
violations.
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its concomitant excessive bureaucratic red tape, would be totally
eliminated. Third, from an economic standpoint, MSHA-regis-
tered contractors would have a market advantage since mining
companies could hire them knowing that the contractors are
aware of their regulatory obligations. Required registration
would eliminate the mining companies' fear that the contractors
will flout the law. Fourth, MSHA would have an additional sanc-
tion available to it. Contractors not complying with the manda-
tory standards could have their registration revoked.
Finally, joint and several liability would be uncalled for
under this system. Contractors would not be free to claim a lack
of notice of pertinent regulations and mining companies could
not contest penalties assigned to them based on a lack of con-
trol. Moreover, the threat of absolute liability of the mining com-
pany would no longer be necessary to force mining companies to
oversee contractor operations. Since the contractor would be
directly liable, the contractor himself would have the incentive
to comply with the regulations. Additionally, the problems of
using progressive sanctions and higher penalties against mining
companies for a contractor's violations would be eliminated."3
Hence, the emphasis of enforcement would be shifted from dis-
puting who is liable to promoting health and safety at the mine
site.'"
VIII. CONCLUSION
To date, attempted resolution of where to assign liability for
independent contractor violations has been a dismal failure. Sta-
tutory, judicial, administrative and regulatory attempts at deal-
ing with the problem have done little more than result in deter-
minations that contractors may be held liable for their viola-
tions, with an absence of guidelines as to which contractors can
be cited and when and under what circumstances they must be
cited. It is not at all clear that MSHA's final regulations solve
these problems. However, since this question involves a host of
issues regarding the health and welfare of miners, the develop-
ment of a cohesive and rational enforcement policy must be a
priority.
See notes 38-53 supra and accompanying text.
However, joint and several liability should be preserved where a mining
company acts in concert with a contractor in violating the Act or materially abets
the commission of a violation.
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